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Orientation is a fundamental mental function that processes the
relations between the behaving self to space (places), time (events),
and person (people). Behavioral and neuroimaging studies have
hinted at interrelations between processing of these three domains.
To unravel the neurocognitive basis of orientation, we used high-
resolution 7T functional MRI as 16 subjects compared their sub-
jective distance to different places, events, or people. Analysis at
the individual-subject level revealed cortical activation related to
orientation in space, time, and person in a precisely localized set of
structures in the precuneus, inferior parietal, and medial frontal
cortex. Comparison of orientation domains revealed a consistent
order of cortical activity inside the precuneus and inferior parietal
lobes, with space orientation activating posterior regions, followed
anteriorly by person and then time. Core regions at the precuneus
and inferior parietal lobe were activated for multiple orientation
domains, suggesting also common processing for orientation across
domains. The medial prefrontal cortex showed a posterior activation
for time and anterior for person. Finally, the default-mode network,
identified in a separate resting-state scan, was active for all orienta-
tion domains and overlapped mostly with person-orientation regions.
These findings suggest that mental orientation in space, time, and
person is managed by a specific brain system with a highly ordered
internal organization, closely related to the default-mode network.
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Orientation in space, time, and person is a fundamental cog-nitive function and the bedrock of neurological and psychi-
atric mental status examination (1, 2). Orientation is defined as
the “tuning between the subject and the internal representation he
forms of the corresponding public reference system”: that is, the
external world (1). Although the representation of the external
world by means of a cognitive map has been widely investigated
(3–5), the way in which the self refers to this map has yet to be
understood. Moreover, the behaving self refers not only to spatial
landmarks but also to remembered or imagined events, or to
people around, yielding a “cognitive mapping” of the time and
person domains of the mental world (2, 6–9). However, it is still
unknown whether mental orientation in space, time, and person
relies on similar or distinct neurocognitive systems.
Several lines of research support the idea that similar neuro-
cognitive systems underlie orientation in these three domains.
Behavioral studies indicate a common psychological metric for
proximity estimations (“cognitive distance”) in space, time, and
person (7); for example, manipulation of stimuli’s distance in one
orientation domain affects the perceived distance in the other
two domains (10, 11). Accordingly, a recent neuroimaging study
mapped cognitive distance estimations in the three domains to a
single region in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) (12). However,
other neuroimaging studies that investigated processing of
places, events, and people separately have found activation in
brain regions besides the IPL, including the precuneus and posterior
cingulate cortices, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and lateral
frontal and temporal lobes (6, 13–29). Notably, these regions
constitute a part of the default-mode network (DMN), a system
involved in self-referential processes (24, 30–35). These find-
ings suggest a common brain system for orientation across
domains, possibly related to the DMN.
Clinical observations in patients with disorientation in space,
time, and person are less clear: on the one hand, clinical syn-
dromes may involve disorientation in several domains simulta-
neously, and disorientation disorders in the three domains involve
lesions in similar brain regions, usually overlapping with the DMN
(1, 2). On the other hand, disorientation may be limited to one
specific domain – space, time, or person (2, 36–40). In addition,
patients with traumatic brain injury or after electro-convulsive
therapy regain their orientation gradually, from personal to spatial
and temporal orientation (41, 42) whereas patients with Alz-
heimer’s disease typically lose orientation in time first, then in
place, and then in person, suggesting that partially separate sys-
tems underlie orientation in each domain.
Here, we investigated the neurocognitive system underlying
orientation in space, time, and person and its relation to the
DMN. To this aim, we used a mental-orientation task, with in-
dividually tailored stimuli in the space (places), time (events),
and person (people) domains. To gain high anatomical speci-
ficity, we used high-resolution 7-Tesla functional MRI (fMRI).
To capitalize on the spatial acuity of the high-resolution fMRI,
we applied a strategy of analyzing each subject individually in
native space and combined the results to compare activations for
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the three domains. Finally, we compared our results to the DMN
as identified in each individual subject by analysis of resting-state
fMRI. We hypothesized that orientation across different do-
mains relies on a shared “core” brain system, in close relation to
the DMN, yet orientation in specific domains may involve ad-
ditional specialized subsystems.
Results
Consistent Organization of Orientation-Related Regions for Space,
Time, and Person in the Precuneus, IPL, and Prefrontal Cortex. High-
resolution fMRI was recorded while subjects engaged in an ori-
entation task, in which they viewed pairs of verbal stimuli in-
dicating places (space domain), events (time domain), or people
(person domain), and had to determine which of the two stimuli
was closer to them (space, physical distance; time, time-elapsed;
person, personal closeness). fMRI analysis for each domain of
orientation (space, time, and person) revealed an identical pattern
of brain activation for all subjects: For all three domains, activa-
tions were found in the precuneus and the adjacent posterior-
cingulate cortex, regions within the IPL, and parts of the superior
frontal sulcus and occipital lobe (Figs. 1 and 2 and Figs. S1 and
S2). In the time and person domains, activation was additionally
found at the mPFC and the superior temporal sulcus (Figs. 1 and 2
and Figs. S1 and S2).
Analysis of activations for the three domains revealed ori-
entation-related regions, which are consistently organized in
each individual subject. In all subjects, the same pattern of a
posterior–anterior axis of activation was found for space, person,
and time, respectively. In the precuneus region, space orienta-
tion activated a posterior region around the parieto-occipital
sulcus, person orientation activated the precuneus and posterior-
cingulate cortex, and time orientation activated the anterior
precuneus (Fig. 1 A and B) (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test). The IPL showed an identical order of posterior–anterior
activation: Space orientation activated a posterior region near
the intraparietal sulcus, person orientation activated posterior
parts of the angular gyrus, and time orientation activated the
anterior angular gyrus, extending into the temporal lobe (Fig. 2
A and B) (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). In the mPFC,
activity for person orientation was always more anterior than for
time orientation (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Time-
orientation activity was found mostly in the left hemisphere (P <
0.01, two-tailed paired-samples t test) whereas person and space
activations were found bilaterally with no significant hemispheric
preference (P = 0.41, P = 0.26 respectively).
To further validate the specificity of the identified activations
and obtain group-level statistics, intraregional general linear
model (GLM) and average event-related activity were computed
for each region which had an ordered activation pattern (pre-
cuneus, IPL, mPFC) and for each orientation domain, and were
compared across subjects. These results were computed from
a separate experimental run than those used to identify the re-
gion of interest, ensuring that the domain-specific activation of
each region was independent of its identification. These
analyses showed that the domain-specific regions of interest
responded consistently and specifically to their preferred orien-
tation domain and not to other domains, across all subjects and
regions (all P values < 0.001, Tukey–Kramer post hoc test) (Figs.
1 C and D and 2 C and D). Finally, we performed a random-effects
Fig. 1. Midsagittal cortical activity during orientation in space, time, and
person. (A) Domain-specific activity in a representative subject, identified by
contrasting activity between each orientation domain and the other two
domains. The precuneus region is active in all three orientation domains,
and the medial prefrontal cortex only in person and time orientation (P < 0.05,
FDR-corrected, cluster size >20 voxels). Dashed black lines represent the limit
of the scanned region in this subject. (B) Precuneus activity in four subjects,
demonstrating a highly consistent posterior–anterior organization (white
dashed line); all other subjects showed the same activity pattern (Fig. S1).
(C) Group average (n = 16) of event-related activity in independent experi-
mental runs demonstrates the specificity of each cluster to one orientation
domain. Lines represent activity in response to space (blue), time (green), and
person (red) conditions. Error bars represent SEM between subjects. (D) Group
average of beta plots from volume-of-interest GLM analysis, showing highly
significant domain-specific activity. Error bars represent SEM between subjects.
P, person; S, space; T, time.
Fig. 2. Lateral cortical activity during orientation in space, time, and per-
son. (A) Domain-specific activity in a representative subject, identified by
contrasting activity between each orientation domain and the other two
domains (P < 0.05, FDR-corrected, cluster size >20 voxels). The inferior pa-
rietal lobe (IPL) is active in all three orientation domains, and the temporal
lobe mostly for time but also for person orientation. Notice the strong left
lateralization of time activations. (B) IPL activity in four subjects, demon-
strating a consistent posterior–anterior organization (white dashed line): All
other subjects showed the same activity pattern (Fig. S1). (C) Group average
(n = 16) event-related plots from independent experimental runs. (D) Group
average of beta plots from volume-of-interest GLM analysis. See Fig. 1 leg-
end for further details.
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GLM group analysis and a probabilistic-maps group analysis (Figs.
S3A and S4A): results were found to be similar to those obtained
from single subjects.
Subjects’ response time, level of emotional valence, stimuli
length, past-versus-future events, and distance of stimuli from the
subject’s self-location in space, time, or person may also affect our
results. Addition of regressors to the design matrix for each po-
tential confound ruled out such effects on orientation-related
activations (SI Methods, SI Results, and Table S1).
Interrelations Between Orientation-Related Regions in Space, Time,
and Person. The finding of domain-selective regions for orienta-
tion revealed a partial anatomical segregation between them. To
determine the interrelations between domains, we contrasted
each domain’s activity with a lexical control task and checked for
overlapping activations. At the individual subject level, most voxels
(87%) were found to be domain-specific, and 13% of the voxels
were activated in response to two or three domains (Fig. 3; for
detailed percentages, see Fig. 3B). At the group level, analyses
demonstrated overlap of 28% between domains in the precuneus
region and IPL (Figs. S3B and S4B). Analysis of the average gap
between orientation-related activations revealed no gaps when
considering the full extent of orientation-related regions and a gap
of 1–7 mm between domain-specific regions in the precuneus and
lateral parietal lobe (Table S2). The results of these overlap and
adjacency analyses suggest the existence of core processing for the
different orientation domains.
The DMN Partially Overlaps with Orientation-Related Regions. The
DMN has been suggested to process “aspects of the [multifac-
eted] self” (31) and was hypothesized to relate to self-projection
in space, time, and person (33), similarly to the orientation
system. In view of this resemblance, as well as the similarity of
the regions we have identified here and the DMN, we examined
the relation between the two systems. The DMN was identified
in a separate resting-state run, using independent-components
analysis (ICA) for each individual subject, and was compared
with subjects’ orientation-related regions (Fig. 4). This compar-
ison demonstrated a significant overlap in the precuneus region
because 50% of DMN voxels were active during mental orien-
tation (identified using the contrast between each orientation
domain and the other two domains). Overlap was also evident in
the IPL and mPFC (14% and 17% of voxels, respectively) (Figs.
S5–S8). We next tested the relation between the DMN and re-
gions related to each domain (space, time, and person): Most of
the DMN voxels active during orientation were within person-
orientation regions (32%), significantly more than in space (12%)
and time (10%) regions, across the whole brain (P < 0.01, Tukey–
Kramer post hoc test) (Fig. 4). Finally, we tested the activity in
each DMN node (precuneus, IPL, and mPFC, as identified in the
resting-state scan) in response to the orientation task in each
domain; the IPL and precuneus nodes were active for all domains
with similar average blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
signal strength, and the mPFC for the person domain (Fig. S9).
Discussion
Functional examination of brain activity during orientation in
space, time, and person revealed several findings. Specific regions
were found to be active for each orientation domain (space,
time, or person) in the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex,
IPL, mPFC, and lateral frontal and lateral temporal cortices.
These domain-specific regions are adjacent and partially over-
lapping and are organized along a posterior–anterior axis.
Finally, all orientation-related regions have a prominent overlap
with the DMN, and DMN nodes responded similarly to the dif-
ferent orientation domains.
The question of whether orientation in space, time, and person
relies on a common brain system is under debate (1, 2). The regions
we have identified—precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex, IPL,
mPFC and lateral temporal and frontal lobes—have been impli-
cated in self-related aspects of space (navigation) (13–17), time
(autobiographical memory) (18–21), and person (representation of
self and others) (22–25, 27–29). In addition, these regions are in-
volved in specifying relations between landmarks in each domain:
cognitive mapping of the spatial environment, recency judgments of
life-events, and social proximity and hierarchy judgments (13, 16,
43–46). However, most previous studies investigated a single do-
main (space, time, or person). Here, we directly compared activity
between orientation domains in individual subjects using high-res-
olution imaging. Comparison of each orientation domain with the
other two domains enabled segregation of domain-specific regions
Fig. 3. Overlap between activations in the space, time, and person domains.
(A) Overall orientation-related activity in a representative subject, identified
by contrasting activity between each orientation domain and the lexical
control task, showing overlap between regions (P < 0.05, FDR-corrected,
cluster size >20 voxels). (B) Group average of the percent of overlap be-
tween active voxels in each orientation domain, demonstrating a partial
overlap between domains (for group-level results, see Figs. S3B and S4B).
Fig. 4. Overlap of orientation activity with the default mode network (DMN).
The DMNwas identified using resting-state fMRI in each individual subject. The
DMN is presented for a representative subject, overlaid with activity during the
orientation task in space, time, and person (identified by contrasting activity
between each orientation domain and the other two domains). (A) Midsagittal
view, focus on the precuneus. (B) Lateral view, focus on the IPL. (C) Average
percent, across subjects, of DMN voxels from all voxels active specifically for a
single orientation domain. DMN voxels were found most prominently in the
person domain (two-tailed t test, all P < 0.01) although some were found also
in the time and space domains. P, person; S, space; T, time.
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of orientation. These regions were adjacent to each other (espe-
cially in the precuneus region), as demonstrated by gap analysis
between activation-specific regions. Moreover, comparison of each
domain to a lexical control task revealed a significant overlap be-
tween the different orientation domains. Finally, activations for the
three domains showed a similar pattern inside the precuneus and
IPL nodes of the DMN. Taken together, these findings suggest that
orientation domains have an intrinsic organization in the precuneus
region, IPL, and mPFC and support a model of a general orien-
tation system with distinct domain-specific divisions and a common
functional core (although the different activations may also overlap
additional different global brain systems). These findings can be
explained by the general function of orientation, which processes
the relation between the self and externally cued stimuli. Orienta-
tion may therefore require a coupling of activation between core
regions involved in self-related processing, with cortical regions
required for domain-specific computations. The organization pat-
tern of adjacent and partially overlapping regions for orientation in
different domains may further reflect the principle of anatomical
duplication, or “recycling,” of an existing cortical system in the
course of evolution, to be used in new roles or domains (47, 48). In
such a conceptual framework, it may be speculated that a primitive
biological mechanism for spatial representation may have been
used to represent other domains such as time and person, and the
relevant brain regions may have gradually diverged and become
partially segregated (8, 9, 47, 49).
The anatomical adjacency and overlap between space, time, and
person regions adds neuroanatomical evidence for the interrela-
tions between these domains on the cognitive level. Large-scale
spatial representations are thought to rely on a “cognitive map”
(3), which combines continuous representations of space with its
hierarchical separation into segments (e.g., neighborhoods, cities,
states, etc.) (50–52), and is partially dependent on the observer’s
reference point (53). Time representation relies on a representa-
tion of a continuous “time line” (54), with segmentation into time
periods (55), and is also affected by the reference point (6, 56).
Person (social) relations are categorized into groups (57), their
perception is affected by personal point-of-view (58), and possible
parallels may exist for a continuous-line representation of “social
space” or a “social cognitive map” (8). In addition, behavioral tests
demonstrated interactions between space, time, and person in
cognitive-distance estimations, priming, and interference (9–11).
These relations led to the formulation of the Construal Level
Theory, which posits that places, events, and people are rep-
resented by a single self-referenced cognitive system and that
distance estimations in this system are directly related to the level
of abstractness of the stimuli (7). Our findings support the idea
that orientation in space, time, and person is represented by re-
lated and interacting cognitive systems; however, we demonstrate
that these systems are not completely identical but are separated
into subsystems specific for each domain.
Our study demonstrated that activity in the DMN overlaps
with the orientation system. The DMN was first described as a
system that is deactivated during cognitive tasks (30). However,
further investigations uncovered a set of self-referential tasks
that activate the DMN—including self-projection, memory, so-
cial representation, navigation, and internally directed thoughts
(21, 24, 28, 31, 34, 35). Our orientation task also activates the
DMN, compatible with the self-referential nature of both sys-
tems. Interestingly, our data shows that the DMN spatially
overlaps mainly person-orientation regions, unlike previous hy-
potheses (31). This specialization of the DMN in personal content
and relations may reflect the central role of personal and social
content in mental life (59). The DMN may therefore serve ori-
entation processes by providing self-referenced content or per-
spectives in the different domains, with an emphasis on personal
content (28). Analysis of averaged activation revealed the pre-
cuneus and IPL DMN nodes to be active for all orientation
domains; the mPFC node was active for the person domain, in
agreement with previous studies (23, 25, 31). The findings of
similar DMN activity across domains strengthen the evidence for
interrelations between the different orientation domains. The
domain-general activity of the DMN, together with the findings of
overlap between activations, suggests that mental orientation
may be accomplished through coactivation of core DMN regions,
which enables self-related processing, together with cortical regions
involved in domain-specific computations that relate to represen-
tation of the “extrinsic” world to which the self is related.
Interestingly, recent large-scale studies have also identified
three subsystems in the DMN (60–62), with similar topography
to the domain-specific regions as found here. Although we
interpret our results with regard to mental orientation in the
different domains (space, time, and person), data recorded in pre-
vious studies was interpreted at another level of description re-
garding its cognitive functions: constructive mental simulation
for the system corresponding to space-orientation regions, con-
struction of personal meaning for person-orientation regions,
and semantic/conceptual processing for time-orientation regions.
These differences may be related to differential recruitment of
these core functional processes for each orientation domain.
Such an interpretation may be especially relevant to regions
specifically active for one orientation domain with a well-defined
functional role, such as the temporal lobe for semantic memory
(63, 64), which may be involved in time orientation. Future work is
needed to further explain how well-known cognitive processes are
involved in orientation to different domains. Furthermore, appli-
cation of both domain-general and domain-specific contrasts en-
abled us to identify areas of convergence between the three
subsystems, a major principle in the organization of the DMN
(61), which merits further investigation.
Our investigation revealed several additional findings. First,
the time-orientation system is strongly left-lateralized, with
prominent activity along the entire length of the superior tem-
poral sulcus, corroborating previous studies (6, 19, 43, 56, 65,
66). Second, the spatial-orientation system was located posteri-
orly, with no involvement of the frontal lobe, and converged
medially on the parieto-occipital sulcus (sometimes referred to
as the retrosplenial cortex), consistent with previous findings (16,
17, 36, 67). This finding is also in line with the suggested sepa-
ration of the DMN into dorsal and ventral routes, of which the
ventral is focused on spatial navigation and scene construction, and
the dorsal on social cognitive processes (61, 68). Finally, no ori-
entation domain activated the hippocampus, despite its un-
disputed role in spatial and temporal representation, navigation,
and cognitive mapping (4, 5, 69). This finding may be related to the
self-referential (egocentric) nature of our task whereas the hip-
pocampus is considered to serve allocentric representations (5, 14);
alternatively, it may relate to the use of existing large-scale mental
maps whereas the hippocampus is more active during navigation
and encoding of the immediate environment (5, 15).
Disturbances of orientation are evident in many neuropsy-
chiatric disorders (1, 2). In a previous investigation, we charac-
terized 22 types of disorientation disorders and classified them as
affecting a single orientation domain or several domains simul-
taneously (2). Our finding of separate but anatomically adjacent
and overlapping regions for orientation in space, time, and
person may explain this pattern of lesion–symptom correlation,
in which circumscribed brain lesions may affect only a specific
orientation domain, but more extensive lesions may lead to dis-
orientation in several domains. Lesion studies further support the
regions we identified: For example, localized damage to the
parieto-occipital region can lead to “heading orientation”—a
specific impairment in the spatial cognitive map, without accom-
panying disorientation in time and person (36, 37); lesions in left
temporo-parietal regions and temporal-lobe epilepsy can induce
specific disorientation in time, consistent with the above-described
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findings (2, 65, 70). An important disorder of orientation is Alz-
heimer’s disease, in which disorientation in space, time, and per-
son is a hallmark. Disorientation in Alzheimer’s disease may be
understood in view of the interrelation between the DMN and the
orientation system because the DMN has a major involvement in
the neuropathology of Alzheimer’s disease (71, 72).
Despite our systematic findings, this study is not free of limi-
tations. Mental orientation relies on (i) representation of the
large-scale environment (places, events, and people), and (ii)
self-reference to these representations; our task involves these
two components of orientation and cannot dissociate between
regions responsible for their processing. In addition, the pro-
cessing of space, time, and person may invoke additional mental
processes specific to each of these domains that are not related
to orientation, as defined here. We attempted to minimize these
effects by choosing a task that focused on orientation processing
in each domain (self-referenced cognitive distance) and also
controlled for various variables that may differ between domains.
However, we cannot completely exclude such domain-specific ef-
fects in our data. The use of individual-subject ICA may introduce
noise into the DMN components, which are furthermore thresh-
old-dependent; therefore, the exact percentage of overlap between
orientation domains and DMN is hard to ascertain. However, our
main results of significant preferential overlap with the person
domain and DMN activity for all orientation domains are in-
dependent of, and cannot be explained by, this accuracy limit.
Finally, despite the steps taken to prevent recall of the stimuli from
the prescan session and subjects’ reports, we cannot completely
rule out involvement of recall processes in our results.
In conclusion, this study identified brain regions underlying
the cognitive function of mental orientation, which relates the
behaving self to its surrounding in the space, time, and person
domains. These regions follow a strict internal organization, with
distinct domain-specific subdivisions and a common functional
core, and are closely related to the DMN. Future research may
deepen our understanding of mental orientation and its modes
of operation in neuropsychiatric disorders.
Methods
Subjects. Sixteen healthy right-handed subjects (eleven males, mean age
23.9 ± 3.9 y) participated in the study. All subjects provided written informed
consent, and the study was approved by the ethical committee of the Canton
of Vaud, Switzerland.
Experimental Paradigm. The same experimental task was used in all three
orientation domains. Stimuli consisted of names of cities (space), events
(time), or people (person) (stimuli are fully described in SI Methods). Subjects
were presented with two stimuli from the same domain (space, time, or
person) and were asked to determine which of the two stimuli is closer to
them: spatially closer to their current location (for space stimuli), temporally
closer to the current time (for time stimuli), or personally closer to them-
selves (for person stimuli). Therefore, the task and instructions were similar
for each orientation domain (space, time, person). To control for distance
and difficulty effects (response-time facilitation for stimuli farther apart
from each other) (51), subjects’ estimates of stimulus’s distances were used
to select pairs of stimuli with adjacent distances.
Stimuli pairs were presented in a randomized block design, each block
containing four consecutive stimuli pairs of a specific orientation domain and
distance. Each pair was presented for 2.5 s, and each block (10 s) was followed
by 10 s of fixation. Subjects were instructed to respond accurately but as fast
as possible. A 5-min training task containing different stimuli was delivered
before the experiment. The experiment comprised five experimental runs,
each containing 18 blocks in a randomized order. In addition, subjects per-
formed a lexical control task in a separate run, in which they viewed similar
stimuli pairs but were instructed to indicate whether or not any of the words
contained the letter “T.” Stimuli were presented using the ExpyVR software
(lnco.epfl.ch/expyvr). After the experiment, subjects rated each task’s
difficulty, the strategy used, the emotional valence of each stimulus (from 1
to 10), and whether each event was a future or past event. In the inquiry
after the experiment, all participants reported not trying to recall these
stimuli ratings during the experiment.
Functional MRI Analysis. MRI acquisition and preprocessing are described in
SI Methods.
Identification of domain-specific and domain-general activity. A GLM analysis (73)
was applied to each subject separately in native space (for full details see SI
Methods). To identify activations specific to each orientation domain, we
used a balanced contrast between each specific orientation domain (space,
time, person) and the average of the other two domains. This contrast
identified regions responding specifically to only one orientation domain. To
identify the full extent of activation for each domain, we contrasted each
orientation domain with the lexical control task. This second contrast en-
abled detection of overlap of activations between several domains. Finally,
to exclude activations which did not rise above baseline, a conjunction
analysis was performed for each of these contrasts with an additional con-
trast between the specific orientation domain and rest (baseline). Activation
regions-of-interest were classified as belonging to separate brain regions
(precuneus, parietal, etc.) as detailed in SI Methods.
Group-level analysis. To validate the specificity of the activation clusters at the
group level, activation clusters were isolated in each subject using the above-
mentioned contrasts [P < 0.05, false discovery rate (FDR)-corrected], with a
minimal threshold of 300 voxels. Clusters were grouped according to their
anatomical region (precuneus region, inferior parietal, medial or lateral
frontal, lateral temporal). A GLM analysis was run for each subject inside
each anatomical region, after correction for serial correlations, normaliza-
tion to the percent of signal change, and addition of motion parameters to
the GLM. To avoid circular-analysis bias, the activation clusters were identified
using only four of the five experimental runs, and the remaining (independent)
run was used for the GLM computation. ANOVAs with Tukey–Kramer post hoc
tests were used to compare the beta values for each domain with the beta
values for the other two domains, across all subjects. In addition, event-related
responses were averaged for each condition, in each activation cluster (again
using four runs for cluster identification and the fifth for response measure-
ment). The event-related responses were averaged across subjects to obtain a
characteristic response. Event-related averages were additionally computed for
each DMN node, using data from all experimental runs. Finally, random-
effects GLM and probabilistic-maps analyses were performed on all subjects
after spatial normalization and smoothing, to obtain further group-level
results (SI Methods).
Overlap of domain-specific activity and the DMN. Independent components
analysis (ICA) with 30 eigenvalues was performed on resting-state scans (74),
using a gray-matter mask to reduce noncortical noise. The DMN was iden-
tified by searching for a component that included the medial prefrontal,
posterior cingulate, and inferior parietal cortices. A component clearly cor-
responding to the DMN was identified in 13 of the 16 subjects (Figs. S5–S7);
in the remaining three, no DMN component could be identified, and they
were therefore excluded from this analysis. Overall overlap between the
DMN and orientation-related regions was computed by counting DMN
voxels that were active in a specific domain (identified using a contrast
between each orientation domain and the other two domains) and dividing
by the total number of DMN voxels. The opposite overlap percentage was
computed by counting DMN voxels that showed domain-specific activity
(contrast between each orientation domain and the other two domains) and
dividing by the sum of all domain-specific active voxels.
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